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SHALL COLORADO PROCEDURE CONFORM WITH
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE?
By HUDSON MOORE of the Denver Bar

OR some two or three decades the question of the adoption of a uniform civil procedure for all Federal District
Courts has been agitated. As you know, equity and law
cases now proceed by different routes. Equity cases are governed by some eighty-odd rules of practice in equity, promulgated from time to time by the Supreme Court, while law
cases to a large extent follow the practice of the state in which
the particular Federal court is located, as required by the conformity practice act (Revised Statute 914).
Considerable opposition to a change in this system, and
to the adoption of a uniform procedure for all civil cases, existed. Lawyers familiar with the practice in their own states
disliked the idea of the adoption of a procedure in the Federal
courts different from that with which they had become accustomed. The late Senator Walsh was a leader in this opposition.
However, the mills of the gods do grind, though slowly,
and in 1934, largely as a result of the long fight of the American Bar Association, assisted by some state bar associations,
including Colorado (Reports, 1913), the Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe by general rules the forms
of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law, so as to secure one form of
civil action for cases in equity and actions at law in the Federal
courts. Attorney General Cummings is entitled to much
credit for obtaining the immediate passage of the act.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, after some delay, has
undertaken the preparation and promulgation of such a uniform system. To aid the court in this important task, it
called to its assistance an Advisory Committee composed of
some fourteen leaders of the legal profession. This committee has as its chairman Hon. Wm. D. Mitchell, former Attorney General, and as its reporter Hon. Chas. E. Clark, Dean of
the Yale Law School. The committee has labored diligently
and composed a simple, brief, yet complete set of practical
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which it submitted, with
the consent and approval of the Supreme Court, to the bench
and bar for consideration. The committee has attempted to
unite the English and best state systems and the substance of
many of the present equity rules into a civil code procedure,
and to produce a work which may, and should, become a
model of uniform civil procedure to all the states.
It was the desire of the committee to submit to the Supreme Court a final draft of the rules in time for the Supreme
Court to have acted prior to January 1, 193 7.
However, following a full discussion of the proposed
rules at the last meeting of the American Bar Association and
the receipt and consideration of many suggested changes the
Advisory Committee found itself unable to complete its work
within that time. The committee held its final session in
Washington, February 1st, and continued its sessions during
the next four days. Before final adjournment the committee
finished the consideration of every suggestion submitted by the
various committees and by individual members of the bench
and bar. The volume of suggestions and the extent of professional cooperation were extraordinary and have resulted in
some changes of substance and many of form in most of the
rules. These rules have been referred to a sub-committee on
style and form. It is now expected that the perfected rules will
be presented to the Supreme Court shortly and that the Supreme Court will act during the present year.
The act provides that such rules "shall not take effect
until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and
until the close of such session," the obvious purpose being to
give Congress the opportunity of legislating regarding the
rules, if it so elects.
Lawyers practicing in the code states have little cause for
objecting to the adoption of the proposed "Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," the official title given to the rules.
It is not the purpose of this paper to review the proposed
rules at length. Those of you who attended the recent meeting
of the American Bar Association there heard the subject ably
discussed. The reporter, Dean Clark, discusses the rules in a
comprehensive article appearing in the July number of the
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American Bar Journal, and several recent articles in the Yale
Law Journal. My purpose is merely to call to your attention
a few of the important provisions and point out some differences which will continue to exist between the Federal rules
and our state practice, and to suggest a few changes so that
Colorado may take advantage of this model procedure.
The rules will effect a radical change in Federal civil procedure. The two most important changes are, substituting
uniformity for conformity to state practice, and abolishing
the distinction between equity and law practice and procedure.
The rules provide that there shall be only one form of action
and one mode of procedure. That form of action shall be
known
as "civil action" and the procedure shall be known as
"civil procedure,"
thus adopting the essence of similar provisions found in code practice in most of the states.
The rules in general provide for simplified and concise
pleadings, and permit service of process by individuals, all
very much in conformity with our code.
District courts are required to establish regular motion
days, at frequent intervals, thus correcting a defect in the practice in our Federal court.
Demurrers are abolished as a separate pleading, but may
be embraced in the answer and heard in advance of the trial
When the court permits, thus preserving the essence of equity
rule 29, and avoiding some lost motion and delay in joining
issue.
If you desire you may go fishing, by oral or written deposition, among your adversary's witnesses to your heart's content, for any reason or no reason, a departure from state practice. You may also examine your adversary under cross
examination, similar to state practice.
Rule 10 is of interest in that it provides that pleadings
shall be signed by an attorney, and need not be verified. The
attorney's signature is taken as a certification by him that to
the best of his knowledge there is good ground for supporting
it. For a wilful violation of the rule, as well as for the insertion of false, scandalous or indecent matter, the attorney may
be held in contempt of court.

The existing practice of requiring evidence to be reduced
to narrative form on appeal is abolished and the state practice
of filing the reporter's transcript is substituted.
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Motions for directed verdict, though made by all parties,
do not waive a jury where the motion is overruled, an improvement over our state practice.
The English practice, now in vogue in the Federal courts,
of ascertaining the qualification of prospective jurors, is retained. Proposed rule 53 provides that the court, in its discretion, may limit the examination of prospective jurors to
such questions as it shall propound to them, and refuse to permit the parties or their attorneys to examine the jurors directly.
The practice is that after qualifying questions are propounded
to the jury by the judge, he will ask any additional questions
submitted to him in writing by counsel which he deems pertinent and proper.
This practice is also in vogue in many states, and much
can be said in its favor. It expedites trials, saving time and
expense. It tends toward the selection of an impartial jury.
It gives the jury the impression that the judge is the director of
the progress of events, and not merely an umpire, refereeing a
contest between opposing counsel.
Some states, including Colorado, follow the practice of
allowing the attorneys to cross-examine the jurors to their
heart's content. This practice is supported by authority. In
an early case, that of Union Pacific Company v. Jones, 21 C.
340, Judge Hayt, speaking for the court but without the citation of any supporting authority, said: "Within reasonable
limits counsel have the right to put questions to jurors not
only for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not grounds
exist for challenges for cause, but also for the purpose of intelligently exercising their peremptory challenges." That case
has been followed in subsequent cases by our Supreme Court,
and is the settled law of this state. This system is frequently
abused by tiresome and tedious questioning of jurors, but at
least one authority supports it, saying: "The usual and better
practice is to allow counsel to conduct the examination under
the direction and supervision of the court." (35 C. J. 397.)
It is a system approved by many trial lawyers, who
assert that it gives them an opportunity of getting acquainted
with the jurors. Many years' practice in states adhering to
each system leads me to observe that the selection of a jury is
more or less an artless art. And I heartily agree with Chief
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Justice Burke, who, a decade ago, in an address before the
American Bar Association, on the subject of "Trial or Tournament," pointing out some of the defects in our jury system,
said: "Commit the examination of jurors to trial judges and
thus make the process of jury selection an earnest attempt to
find fair men, instead of a battle royal to impanel a prejudiced
tribunal."
A major difference in the Federal system and our practice
is that dealing with instructions to the jury.
As you know, Section 205 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that: "Before the argument is begun the court
shall give such instructions upon the law to the jury as may
be necessary, which instructions shall be in writing and signed
by the judge."
Proposed rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
preserves the common law practice now in vogue in the Federal
courts, and that of courts of a great many states in providing
that, "The court shall instruct the jury after the arguments
are completed." Such instructions, of course, may be oral or
in writing, at the pleasure of the trial judge.
The origin of jury instructions is, to me at least, somewhat hazy.
Blackstone in commenting upon the age when the witnesses composed the jury says: "For the oath of the jurors
to find according to the evidence was construed to be, to do it
according to the best of their knowledge. This seems to have
arisen from the antient practice of taking recognitions of assize
at the first introduction of that remedy; the sheriff being
bound to return such recognitors as knew the truth of the fact,
and the recognitors when sworn being to retire immediately
from the bar and bring in their verdict according to their own
personal knowledge without hearing extrinsic evidence or receiving any direction from the Judge."
We know, however, that at an early date and probably
from the inception of jury practice, as it is today, it has been
the custom for the judge to give instructions to the jury, for
as far back as the Year Books go we find the court delivering
a charge to the jury.
The final development of the common law practice in
this particular is well stated by Blackstone to be: "When the
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evidence is gone through on both sides, the Judge, in the presence of the parties, the counsel, and all the others, sums up the
whole to the jury; omitting all superfluous circumstances, observing wherein the main question and principal issue lies,
stating what evidence has been given to support it, with such
remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction, and giving
them his opinion in matters of law arising upon the evidence."
Dean Roscoe Pound, commenting on the common law
practice, says: "The trial judge, after the arguments, charges
the jury, that is, addresses them orally, explaining the issue or
issues on which they are to pass, stating the law applicable
thereto, summing up the evidence on each side and, if he thinks
proper, discussing and commenting upon it."
The exercise of his common law powers in qualifying the
jury, summing up the evidence, after but not before listening
to the arguments of counsel; expressing an opinion regarding
the evidence, in exceptional cases; instructing the jury after
argument in an informal talk, and not by reading from cold,
formal type, regarding the questions involved and the applicable rules of law; by an able, upright judge, are all valuable
aids in producing a fair and just verdict.
However, these common law powers were not always
quietly acquiesced in by the Englishman. Thus, in the trial
of Colonel Lilburne for treason, about the middle of the 17th
century, that doughty defendant uttered a challenge which
delighted his fellow countrymen when he said to the court:
"The jury by law are not only judges of fact but of law also,
and you who call yourselves judges of the law are no more
but Norman intruders, and in deed and in truth, if the jury
please, are no more but cyphers to pronounce their verdict."
To which Mr. Justice Jermin, presiding, in wrathful defense of
the bench, replied: "Was there ever such a damnable, blasphemous heresy as this is, to call the judges of the law cyphers."
We shall see as we proceed that the Supreme Court of the
United States on one occasion, some one hundred and fifty
years later, fully justified Colonel Lilburne's characterization.
Many reasons have been advanced for the refusal of some
of the states to follow the English practice. During the 17th
century struggles between the courts and the Crown, juries
had proved an effective check upon the Crown, so much so
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that Blackstone credits English civilization, in a large measure,
to the jury system.
In the American Colonies the Crown judges were often
incompetent, and sometimes were laymen, ignorant of the
principles of the law.
Immigrants to America were well aware of the tyrannies
of Jeffreys and his ilk, as well as of the oppressions of the
Crown and servile judges holding office at the will of the
Crown, willing to do the Crown's bidding; hence our forefathers seemed more concerned in preserving the jury as a bulwark of political liberty than the making of it an efficient tribunal, with the result that the American development of jury
trial has tended to limit the authority of the trial judge and
increase the powers of the jury.
This tendency manifested itself to the extent that some
of the states, including Georgia, incorporated in their early
constitutions provisions to the effect that in all criminal cases
the jury should be the sole judges of both law and fact.
That doctrine, at least on one occasion, was extended to
civil cases by the Supreme Court of the United States. In the
case of Georgia v. Brailsford (3 Dallas 1: 1 Law Ed. 483),
being an original proceeding, tried to a jury in the United
States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jay, with the approval
of the entire bench, instructed the jury in part as follows:
"The facts comprehended in the case are agreed: the only
point that remains is to settle what is the law of the land arising from those facts; and on that point, it is proper that the
opinion of the court should be given. * * * It may not be
amiss, here, gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule,
that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law it is the province of the court, to decide. But it
must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this
reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless
a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and
on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will
pay that respect which is due to the opinion of the court. For,
as on the one band, it is presumed that juries are the best judges
of fact; it is, on the other hand, presumable that the courts are
the best judges of law. But still both objects are lawfully
within your power of decision."
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Truly a supplicating appeal to the jury, by the most
powerful court in the world, to accept its advice as to the law,
and that in a case in which a verdict should have been directed.
On which occasion, the office of juror reached its zenith and
the office of the trial judge the very nadir of its functions.
The doctrine so announced in this case was so astounding
that as a precedent, it was permitted to remain in innocuous
desuetude until some sixty-odd years later, when a trial judge
had the temerity to refuse to follow it, naively remarking that
he doubted the accuracy of the reporter (U. S. v. Morris, F. C.
No. 15815).
Since the case does not appear ever to have been formally
overruled, one may wonder if the New Deal lawyers did not
overlook a point in not having the validity of AAA tested by
a jury composed of Western or Southern farmers.
Dean Clark truly says that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure attempt to follow and incorporate the English and
"best state systems." And that "We brought to our meeting
a real cross-section of procedural experience in this country."
The days of Jeffreys are no more. There are no Crowns
in America to fear. Our sole purpose should be to make the
jury system as efficient as possible.
In speaking of the advantages of oral instructions over
written, Judge J. Foster Symes, who has had broad experience
under both systems, observed: "Written instructions are not
always consistent, tend to be a collection of disjointed statements that do not blend together harmoniously, and the reading of them detracts from their value. Oral instructions are
more apt to engage the attention of the jury, carry more conviction and form a more harmonious whole."
Judge Frank McDonough, also an experienced trial
judge, when he was on the bench, preferred the state practice
of instructing the jury before argument, saying:
"I am -much in favor of the practice in Colorado of instructions
being given before arguments. My reasons are, briefly, that the jurors
gain their views of the law to be applied to the evidence at first hand
from the court's statement of the law, and such method prevents the
possibility of attorneys attempting to inject into their arguments incorrect statements as to what the law is or is not or ought to be."

However, it seems to me that the rule itself answers these
objections, in providing in substance that the court shall so far
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as practicable, inform counsel of its proposed action upon requested instructions prior to argument.
I believe the pendulum is swinging back, and the present
tendency is towards restoring to the trial judge his ancient and
proper functions. This is as it should be. I again quote Chief
Justice Burke, who said: "Restore to the trial judge his ancient right and duty to act as an advisor to the jury, without
which the jury system never was and never will be successful."
The right and power of the trial judge to qualify the
jury; to sum up the evidence at the conclusion of the argument, expressing an opinion upon the facts in exceptional
cases, when such an opinion would seem to be of aid to the
jury; explaining to the jury the issues and the principles of
law applicable thereto in an informal talk, previously reducing
such of the instructions dealing with technical questions, as
may seem desirable to the particular trial judge, to writing,
must inevitably aid in the production of a just verdict.
Many trial judges, experienced in the art of written instructions, would probably continue that method. Others
would find the use of oral instructions, or a combination of
oral and written instructions, more satisfactory.
If the main object in trial procedure is to form a record
that will best withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court,
then written instructions are probably safer. If the chief purpose is to obtain a just verdict, then unshackle the trial judge,
restore his common law powers, and give him some discretion
in conducting his court.
The particular proposed rules which I have discussed,
when adopted, will represent the combined wisdom of the
United States Supreme Court and its able Advisory Committee. They received the endorsement of the American Bar Association at its recent meeting. They have proven their worth
by many years of application in the English and Federal courts
and the courts of many of our states.
How then can we benefit by some of these rules, backed
by such a wealth of experience and so ably sponsored, and at
the same time restore to the trial judge some of his ancient
functions? The answer is simple. Let our Supreme Court
continue its good work, begun by it in the adoption of rule
14b, which provides: "The rules governing comments by
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district judges on evidence shall be those now in force in the
United States district courts," by going further and adopting
rules providing in effect that the trial judge, in his discretion,
may limit the examination of prospective jurors to such questions as he shall propound; and that instructions must be
given at the conclusion of the arguments and may be either
oral or written. This the Supreme Court may do, by virtue
of either its inherent or statutory powers, under the authority
of Walton v. Walton, 86 C. 1, and Kolman v. People, 89 C. 8.
While probably not within the scope of this paper, I may
mention another minor difference, that of some $6,000 per
year, in the salary of a Federal District Judge and a state District Judge. This association has done much tending to the
correction of some of this inequality. Now that the depression is over, it should continue the good work in an effort to
obtain concrete results. I do not apprehend any dissent from
the state judges on this point.

PREPARATION OF WILLS--THE INVESTMENT
CLAUSE
By C. E. KETTERING, Judge of the County Court,
City and County of Denver
This article is intended to direct the attention of lawyers
and others (see People vs. Anthony Jersin, -

Colo. -,

not

yet reported), who are drafting wills, to a common omission
which in many cases is resulting in estates being administered
contrary to a testator's intention in a material respect. I refer
to the necessity of the lawyer (in the event it happens to be a
lawyer) advising the testator of the law relating to the investment of estate funds.
The problem, if discussed with the testator, is extremely
simple; if not, is frequently most perplexing to the executor
and beneficiaries, with serious and unnecessary disputes and
uncertainties as to the duty and extent of discretion of the
executor in disposing of stocks and other "non-legal" investments which may comprise the assets of the estate.
The lawyer should discuss the problem with the testator.
He should explain that if the will is silent on the subject, this
makes it the duty of the executor to proceed with reasonable
dispatch to liquidate all "non-legal" investments and reinvest
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the available proceeds in legal investments as defined in the
statutes. This means that an executor who delays such liquidation in what may be a conscientious endeavor to obtain a
better price for his securities, on an anticipated future rising
market, may be confronted by a falling market and by parties
interested in the estate who may wish to inquire into whether
the executor acted with "reasonable promptness."
A cautious and responsible executor could hardly be
blamed if he refuses to run the risk of a court inquiry into what
constitutes "a reasonable time," by selling non-legals immediately after his letters are issued regardless of stock market
trends or special considerations effecting the specific stock. He
cannot be blamed if he proceeds immediately to liquidate even
the best of stocks, yielding 5 and 6 per cent, and reinvests in
2 and 3 per cent "legal" securities.
Such an executor can, and in my opinion should reason,
that if the testator wanted the executor to exercise his discretion in determining the most advantageous time to sell nonlegals, taking into consideration the state of the market, etc.,
all he had to do was say so in the will. Therefore, the testator's failure to so provide in the will must mean that he
intended the executor to keep the estate funds invested in those
securities which the statutes of Colorado define as being the
''exclusive" securities in which estate funds may be invested,
viz., so-called legal securities, and that the testator did not
want the executor to indulge in any bouts with the stock market in trying to guess (or if you prefer, "to determine by careful analysis of business trends, conditions and futures")
whether the stock market would rise or fall in the week, month
or year following the death of the testator, and if so, when and
how much.
It is certainly not the intention of this article to discuss
or advocate the respective merits of requiring an executor to
invest estate funds in legal securities, or, on the other hand,
leaving the matter of investments to his absolute or limited
discretion-I am only advocating that a testator be advised
that such a problem exists and be given the opportunity to
state his views on the same, so that where he remains silent on
the subject, we may interpret his silence to mean an adoption
of the statutory provisions, and not merely that he failed to
consider the matter.

LET'S MAKE THE LAW UNIFORM!
A Plea for Uniformity in State Securities Laws and
Regulations
By HON. SEYMOUR M. HEILBRON, EsQ., Securities

A

Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

SHARP, shrill whistle of incredulous surprise is raised

from his quivering lips. And then he falls over into a
dead faint.
You have just finished informing him that he will not
be permitted to sell shares of stock in his company until he
registers under the State Securities Act. But this is not the
reason for the whistle nor the faint. These phenomena evidencing the subject's condition of prostrate unbelief and surprise have been caused by your frankness in imparting to him
the further painful information that methodical examination
must be pursued-carefully and without haste. This will
take time.
And this he doesn't like! He recovers from his faint.
He is not so easily downed, you see, and his shocked surprise
gives way to protesting indignation. "Why, this is preposterous," he says, "we encountered no silly delay of this kind in
Nevada !"
The latter part of this statement is doubtless true, inasmuch as there is no securities regulation and no "Blue Sky"
law in Nevada. However, he might just as easily refer to
some other state having a Blue Sky Law and in which state
he has qualified his stock under some provision of the law
which enabled him to evade an exhaustive examination of him
and his plan and to avoid the consumption of time necessary
for it. The overwhelming majority of states have laws regulating securities transactions but there is little uniformity
among them. Similarity there is between some but others
more than make up for this by the contrary divergence between them on matters of procedure and requirement alike.
The first of these so-called "Blue Sky" laws was enacted in
Kansas in 1911. They are popularly known as "Blue Sky"
laws because an early decision of the courts characterized certain securities transactions as "speculative schemes that have
no more basis than so many feet of blue sky." (Hall vs.
Geiger-Jones, 242 U. S. 339.)
16
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The District of Columbia, together with the State of
Nevada, already mentioned, are still without legislation specifically controlling the business of dealing in securities. This,
however, does not mean that the balance of the states are bulwarked with adequate laws covering this field. Delaware,
Maryland, New Jersey and New York take care of this subject, if it can be said to be cared for in such fashion, by the
enforcement of fraud acts, which are punitive, rather than
preventive. We with Blue Sky protection call it "locking the
stable after the horse is stolen."
In the testimony taken before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives
of the 73rd Congress, we find upon page ninety-eight of the
first session, the following classification of the securities laws
of the states:
They roughly fall into two classes:
"1.

Fraud laws, such as exist in three states* and which are not

set in motion until evidence is presented that fraud in the sale of securities has been or is about to be committed.
"2.
Regulatory laws existing in forty-three states, which attempt
to regulate the traffic in securities by forbidding their sale, until an application has been filed and permission granted by the State. This type of
law may be further classified as follows:
"(a)
Dealer-licensing laws, which seek to exercise the desired
control through dealers, by requiring that they obtain licenses under
which they are held responsible for fraud or gross negligence in their
transactions.
"(b)
Specific issue-permit laws, which prohibit the sale of any
security unless a permit has been granted by the State for the sale of each
specific issue. Such permits are granted only after the applicant has
filed more or less detailed information concerning the issue offered.
"This group of regulatory laws may be further subdivided, in
accordance with their classification of securities, as follows:
"1.
Speculative laws which treat all securities as either 'speculative' or 'non-speculative' and apply the provisions of the statutes to
speculative issues only.
"2.
The typical blue-sky laws that divide securities into several

different groups, exempting the sounder issues and applying the regulations to others.

Some transactions also, such as judicial sales, isolated

sales by individuals, and sales to satisfy mortgages, are usually exempted."
The writer cannot agree with the statement made by
Lasser and Gerardi in their book "Federal Securities Act Pro*Actually four states, as above recited.
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cedure" (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934), which says
that Federal legislation was needed to come to the rescue of
the states because "State laws had failed to curb the distribution of unsound securities * * *." The authors hold that
such condition was "attributable to a number of facts which
may be summarized as follows:
(a)
Absence of protective securities legislation in certain states
and inadequate legislation in others.
(b) Lack of uniformity in the laws of the various states.
(c) Willingness of victims to condone the offense or accept a
compromise.
(d) Evasions possible by conducting sales on an interstate basis.

While disagreeing with the premise, it must be admitted
that these above enumerated handicaps do exist and must be
recognized, and must be remedied where they can. True it is
that the scope of the Federal Acts cannot encompass that of
the states. Nevertheless, such an indifferent shrugging of the
shoulders on the part of the states does not make toward the
achievement of the common goal-that of protection to the
investor-whether his is an interstate or an intrastate transaction.
No amount of strict legislation and rigid enforcement
can altogether eliminate the "c" and "d" factors listed above.
Victims, it is unfortunately true, more often than not, find
their civic sense conveniently hidden away in the folds of their
pocketbooks. Once they have been reimbursed in whole or
even in part, their memory always fails them and they become
all too willing to forgive and forget. Strong reasons are sometimes urged why they should accept for their silence restitution of even the most nominal part of that which they have
lost. "Either that or else nothing at all," they are threatened,
and as they were duped in the beginning, so they are in the
end. And this condition obtains whether breach of Federal
or State law is concerned. Such is a characteristic of human
behavior which transcends fine distinctions between the powers of Congress and those of State legislatures.
As to the "d" factor, this likewise works both ways.
States rights protect the crooked promoter and the unscrupulous securities dealers from the heavy hand of Federal agencies,
while he hugs the haven of intrastate exemptions and viceversa he is immune from the enforcement of State laws while
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he rests upon the immunity of transactions exempt from the
State "touch" by reason of these transactions being in interstate commerce.
But by making both State and Federal agencies fully
effective, he is placed squarely between two inescapable fires
and there is no course for him to pursue except that of honest
dealing and adherence to the requirements of both laws.
And that brings us to the consideration of the "a" and
"b" factors in the above list. The first of these refers to the
absence of any legislation in some few states, as has been referred to, and the inadequacy of protective law in others. The
other factor listed as "b" above recites the lack of uniformity
in the securities laws of the various states. This lack of uniformity actually covers as well, however, the absence and
inadequacy which is the subject matter of the first factor.
This is obviously so, because if a standard form of Securities
Act were set up for uniform adoption by all of the states and
the District of Columbia, then it would follow naturally that
at the same time its adoption would be urged to supplant such
inadequate measures as presently appear on the statute books
in some jurisdictions and serve little purpose other than that.
Further, such course would make for the introduction of Blue
Sky legislation in those few states still without any such laws.
True it is that the American Bar Association, through
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws, after seven years of consideration, did adopt a Uniform
Securities Act at the meeting in Memphis in 1929, which was
subsequently approved by the association itself. This was
done only after four drafts of the proposed Act had been made
and after three sessions of the conference had considered it
section by section.
In making its report, the committee acting for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
said:
"The advantages of uniformity in Sale of Securities
Acts, or "Blue Sky Acts" as they are generally called, needs no
argument. In the case of many security issues there is a broad
market extending into many states. All of the states have
acts regulating the sale of securities, but there are wide variations between the statutes in different states * * *. The
principal difficulty has been to facilitate the marketing of
sound securities of unquestionablemerit without burdensome
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formalities while at the same time protecting the public
againstfraud."
The latter statement presents the crux of proper securities regulation. Sometimes, unfortunately, sight is lost of the
importance of keeping legitimate business from extinction in
the zeal of preventing fraudulent enterprise to flourish. More
often, however, the State Securities Commissioner finds himself in the position of not being able to give aid to the honest
securities dealer as issuer, because of the maze of diversified
law in which such applicant finds himself entangled.
In an overwhelming number of instances, however,
much discussion is aroused concerning that portion of the
Blue Sky laws devoted to exemptions from registration. And
although it is not felt that this subject should be neglected
when we clarify the law and make the regulations uniform,
still it is sincerely felt that too much time is now consumed in
attempting to fit "unfittable" sets of facts into exemptions,
from the first not applicable to the circumstances presented.
It is a friendly hint to those who have a desire to cooperate in
the worthwhile task of securities regulation: Stand on your
legal rights, when you are sure of them, and do not view State
securities registration as a badge of shame. If there is doubt
as to a possible exemption, then register; it shows your confidence in the ability of your security to be registered.
But I do not wish to digress here too much from the
problem of uniformity.
It may be frankly and boldly stated here that the American Bar Association has not done all that might be done to
properly carry out "the work so nobly begun." The conclusion of the report of the committee, quoted in part above, is
worded as follows: "The present act (referring to the text
of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act referred to hereinbefore)
has been unanimously approved * * * and is now submitted

to the various states for adoption in the interest of uniformity." Such adoption, however, has not been made the matter
of effort or interest on the part of any committee or agency of
the American Bar Association, and it appears to benefit little
to have a Uniform Act of this character framed without putting it into force. It has lain dormant so long that now in
some respects this excellent work on the part of the Uniform
Law Commissioners has become needful of change and
amendment to make it conform to present-day circumstances.
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The point, however, aside from the need of revising the
uniform law from time to time (no consideration has been
given to it since amendments effected by the conference at its
1930 meeting) is the urgent need of taking measures toward
securing its adoption in all of the states, including those without any present law of such character. This task logically is
one for the American Bar Association, under whose sponsorship this Uniform Law has been created; it is a natural supplement to its work so far done and it is not inconsistent with
work of like nature being presently carried on. For instance
there is a special committee devoted to the work of opposing
the ratification of the Federal Child Labor Amendment by
the legislatures of the states and to urge the adoption in its
stead of adequate State laws. Why not a special committee
to work for the adoption of a Uniform Blue Sky law?
It is to be expected that new problems should arise in
the seven years which have elapsed since the drafting of this
model Act. In that day perhaps the matter of oil interests
was just a faint shadow on the horizon; today it is a consideration of eclipsable proportions. And no one will say that
the vague provision for it in the Uniform Act is to any degree
adequate. Vying equally with it for attention is the matter
of the issuing, offering and sale of the ubiquitous installment
investment trust in its many diversified forms and with its
endless embellishments, and the problem of so-called "investment counsel." Then again there is that troublesome question
mark-the whiskey certificate-ignored entirely by that Uniform Act because the need for giving this question attention
did not then exist. Under section fourteen of the Uniform
Sale of Securities Act there is provision made for the escrow
of promotional stock and for stock issued for intangibles,
which is proper. But the trend today is to go further even
than that and insist upon the impounding of the proceeds
from the sale of the stock offered, until the minimum amount
necessary for successful operation has been riased. Inclusion
of this provision in the Unifrom Act would today constitute
a salutary amendment. We must not be unmindful either of
such conditions as have been altered by the advent of the Federal Securities and Exchange Act and its amendments. This
is particularly so in matters affecting advertising and the circulation of prospecti in the states. In this regard the Uniform
Act as it presently stands is not sufficiently clear and certainly
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not adopted to meet present conditions and possibilities of
conflict between the provisions which may be read into it and
the Federal requirements.
A problem which frequently arises under the state of
things as they presently exist, concerns itself with the selfsame Federal prospectus. This is the official offering literature
of a new issue contemplated to be sold interstate and it is not
to be supposed that the issuer or the underwriter is eager in
addition to it, to prepare a separate circular for use in each of
the individual states.
For instance, it has been the practice for the principal
underwriters to display their names on the cover sheet of the
Federal prospectus. This has been done so universally that
belief has sprung up that this was a requirement of the Securities and Exchange Commission; that it was strictly necessary
that the names of the principal underwriters be printed on the
cover. Dispute arose in instances where the underwriters
whose names appeared in such fashion were not registered or
licensed in some of the states wherein the prospectus was
sought to be circulated and the securities offered.
There was insistence by the states that the names of the
unlicensed underwriters be deleted from the cover page under
the provision in their laws that none but registered dealers
might offer for sale, solicit inquiries about, or deal in securities. This insistence was met with the argument that such
deletion would be contrary to Federal regulation. The Securities and Exchange Commission finally helped to clear the air
by stating that it was not necessary to place on the cover page
the names of the underwriters. It appears to be the better
practice under the circumstances, however, to place the names
of none of the underwriters on the cover, although some
houses prefer to use a separate "jacket" upon which appear
only the names of the underwriters registered in the state in
which such "jacketed" prospectus is proposed to be used.
More often than is pleasant to contemplate this Federal
prospectus innocently involves the issuer or the underwriter
or both in a mare's nest of unexpected trouble, little anticipated by him. This rather full and complete book which is
the Federal prospectus has been zealously worked over by him
and by his accountant, by his attorney and by a host of other
experts. Out of these weeks of tedious effort comes the final
result. He has done his best to make a full disclosure of all
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of the material facts and to hide or conceal nothing. The
requirement of the Securities and Exchange Commission, of
course, is that he should do this. However, in accomplishing
this very thing, he may have barred himself from offering the
security in some State under the provisions of the Blue Sky
law of that particular State.
For instance, to cite an actual example, the registration
statement effective in Washington and the prospectus based
upon it reveals that the promoter, for an investment of three
thousand ($3,000.00) dollars, receives seventy-five per cent
of the voting stock of the company. A million and a quarter
dollars is to be raised from the sale of the stock and this individual, by reason of his control of the common stock, will
control that fund, and his sole investment amounts to only
three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars. Having made a full
disclosure of this arrangement, he confidently goes ahead and
then he meets opposition in his attempt to qualify under the
Blue Sky laws of the states.
It is not argued that he should not be stopped in carrying
out such plan; rather it is believed that such a setup should
be everything but encouraged. Such discouragement is the
function of the State Commissions, as distinguished from the
scope of the Federal Commission. Nevertheless, the legislation under which he is to be prevented from carrying out this
design should be so framed as to warn him, at the very outset,
from attempting such distribution of the common voting
stock as outlined, before he incurs the expense of time, effort
and money in Federal registration. Certainly all of the circumstances for which qualification may be refused cannot be
listed in any one State statute, but possibly the major ones
may be. Take the Pennsylvania law, for instance. The
refusal of the application in the example cited, using the
wording of that Act, would be upon the basis that the commission is not "satisfied that the proposed plan of business of
the applicant is fair, just and equitable."
This stated lack of fairness, justice and equitability in
the proposed plan is cited to cover a whole host of situations,
from lack of adequate working capital to refusals of registration because of failure to come within the terms of the Act.
There is only one other ground for refusal of a new applicant
and that is lack of repute. So often a disappointed applicant
is a puzzled one as well. He knows the commission's decision
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but has difficulty in fathoming the reasons. And the commission all the time has just cause for its action, but is handicapped because the Act is framed in the manner indicated.
Nor is the Uniform Act of any great improvement in
this regard. In Section 8 (i) it is provided as follows:
"If upon examination of any application the Commission shall find that the sale of the security referred to there'in
would not be fraudulent and would not work or tend to
work a fraud upon the purchaser and that the enterprise or
business of the issuer is not based upon unsound business
principles, it shall record the registration * * *."
This provision may have been designed to give the Commissions generous latitude in passing upon securities applications, but it leaves doubt and uncertainty in the minds of anyone who reads it. It would in no degree curtail the latitude of
action if for instance the meaning of "unsound business principles" was amplified. It could be done by listing the chief
examples and then providing for others not specifically defined
or set forth.
Take the matter of selling commissions. This subject
has always been more or less regulated by the State Securities
Commissions. The Pennsylvania Act brands as fraudulent
any transaction in which there is the "gaining, directly or indirectly through the sale of any security, of an underwriting
or promotion fee or profit, so gross and exorbitant as to be
unconscionable" (section 2-f). The Uniform Act as cited
above in section 8 (i) prohibits fraudulent sales of securities
and is it then to be inferred that the bar against fraudulent
sales as outlined in that section extends to sales assumed to be
fraudulent because of unconscionable profit or commission?
It is sometimes pitiful to see an applicant graduate into
a successful S. E. C. registrant only to be "flunked" by the
State commissions because the sales commission makes it impossible to clear the issue in the states. The last remembered
example of this was an issue providing for a commission of
thirty-eight and a half per cent (3 8 Y2 %), and be it said in his
favor that the attorney, when it was pointed out to him, was
apologetically resigned to omitting its offering in the State in
question.
Less pity would be due such an unfortunate had he, in
the first instance, the means available to him of clear information as to the matter of sales commissions and underwriting
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spreads and some sort of notice as to that which under no circumstances would be tolerated; some sort of a warning as to
what would be encountered by him when he presented his
issue for qualification in the states. Of course, too few lawyers, issuers, underwriters and persons generally giv'e anything
but remote second thought to the matter of State securities
requirements and for these, needless to say, little anxiety need
be exercised.
Further upon this question of selling commission, sales
expense and underwriting profit, a factor which is always
considered by State Commissions, an examination of the requirements of the respective states shows, first, a lack of uniformity, and second, in a great number of instances, no
accurate information as to exactly what the limitation or
requisites may be.
The following rough classification will readily show
this. Here is the roster:
STATE RESTRICTIONS AS TO COMMISSIONS AND SALES
EXPENSE
No Blue Sky Law:
Delaware, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, Nevada, District of
Columbia.
No Specific Provision in the Law:
Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana (by uniform rule, oil and mining securities 20%, industrial issues 15%, bank and insurance
shares 10%), Maine, Massachusetts (none, except exorbitant commission or profit makes sale fraudulent), New Hampshire, Ohio
(none, except "qualification when selling cost is moderate, e. g.
10%"), Oregon, Pennsylvania (none, except exorbitant commission or profit makes sale fraudulent), South Dakota, Texas (none,
but application must show commissions paid, whether in stock or
cash), Washington, Wyoming (none, but regulation requires commissions to be paid upon actual cash received and not upon subscriptions taken).
Maximum Amount Made Discretionary with Securities Commission:
Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico (discretionary, but prohibits commissions paid to officers and directors), Oklahoma, Utah, Montana, Wisconsin (discretionary, but
under such discretionary power, maximum is fixed at 10%).
10% Maximum:
Kansas (including all sales expense), North Carolina (10% of
sale price).
121 2 % Maximum:
Nebraska (1 212% including all sales expense).
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15 % Maximum:
Alabama (generally 15%, but bank and insurance companies 10%.
finance and mortgage companies 10%), North Dakota (no commissions to be paid salesmen until cash is received).
20% Maximum:
California (generally 20%, building and loan companies 10%, finance arid mortgage companies 10%, industrial companies 10o,
royalty companies 15%, prospective public utilities 10%, holding
companies for stock of insurance companies 15%), Florida (company must receive 80% of proceeds of sale), Iowa (20% of sales
price), Kentucky (unlawful to pay or receive more than 20%0 commission), Michigan (20% including all sales expense), Mississippi
(20% including all sales expense), Tennessee (company must receive 80%0 of proceeds of sale), West Virginia (20% of sales price
including all sales expense).
25% Maximum:
Georgia (company must receive 75% of proceeds of sale), Montana (25%o of sales price).
30% Maximum:
Virginia (law provides 20%, which can be extended to 30% by
commission).

So we can readily see that if any general distribution of
securities is sought the issuer or distributor is placed in a state
of most uncomfortable perplexity in arriving at what should
be the proper commission to be fixed, so as to conform to the
respective State requirements.
At a glance this convinces one that if there is to be a limitation of the percentage to be charged for selling cost, it then
should not vary with the geographical locations of the states
or in some like arbitrary fashion. It is equally as important
that the investor in Texas be fairly dealt with as it is for the
securities purchaser in Minnesota. And it is only proper that
the securities seller shall have the means of handily available
knowledge as to what he may and what he may not charge.
Such allowance should be fair to him and primarily fair to the
investor. The best arrangement, it appears, is to have it
scaled to meet the peculiar conditions applicable to particular
classes of investments as provided for by Louisiana, as shown
above.
Uniformity in the law itself will go far in aiding meritorious investment business and at the same time will permit
the prevention of fraudulent practices and injury to the in-
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vestor by dishonest undertaking. However, there is need, in
addition, for uniformity in regulations of the states, in forms
and procedure. The purpose of all legislation in this field is
the same, namely, to protect the investor, and there can be seen
no deviation from devotion to that purpose by making requirements in all of the states similar. Selfishly, there may be
some states which yet feel that by making the rules less stringent, they may attract business that otherwise would center in
other states. But, naturally, such view is obviously shortsighted, to say the least, because it is the resident of their own
home state that eventually pays for such laxity, and more
often than not, pays and pays through the nose.
However, much of what I have said concerns not so
much the matter of uniformity and clarification of the law
as it possibly does the standardization of rules and procedure.
Certainly the matter of selling commission and underwriting
fees could well be made the subject of commission rules. Interpretation of the phrase "sound business principle" might
even be made the subject of some agreed more or less standard
definition. So, if uniformity can be accomplished by making
plain and understandable the requirements of the State Securities Commissions by standardizing their rules instead of or as
well as their laws, let that be done as well. It is strongly felt,
however, that the first step should be in the uniformity of the
law. First, because this being the basis of any regulation or
ruling, its perfection should therefore be first; secondly, because this work has already been started and it presently needs
but to be carried on and, what is more, carried into effect by
urging the legislatures of the states to act.
There is a willingness on the part of Securities Commissioners everywhere to do this service for the aid of that part of
the securities profession which is committed to the principles
of honesty and fair dealing. There should be allowed no false
idea that it is the desire of those charged with administration
of this most important field of the law, to leave in state of
vague confusion and hazy doubt, the law which it is their
duty to enforce.
The Securities Commissioner has an abhorrence of "red
tape" and delay, and therefore will welcome, I know, any
effort toward making the law uniform. Let the lawyer and
the American Bar Association do their share!

DIVORCE-SUPPORT MONEY SPENT FOR MINOR CHILD BY MOTHER
AFTER DESERTION BY HUSBAND BUT BEFORE DIVORCE SUIT

FILED-Gourley vs. Gourley-No. 14050-Decided November
15, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACT: Plaintiff filed suit for divorce, custody of minor child,
court costs, counsel fees, permanent alimony and maintenance for herself
and child, title to certain real estate described in the complaint, and a
$4,000 judgment on account of money expended by her to support the
minor child for a period of eight years next preceding the filing of her
complaint, during which time the husband had deserted the family. The
trial court awarded plaintiff all but future alimony and the $4,000 judgment.
HELD:
1. In proceeding, in a divorce case, to enter an order
upon the husband for the support of a minor child, the court looks only
to the future. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Young and Mr.
Justice Holland dissent.
ERROR-Reuss, etc. vs. Rawleigh CompanyNo. 14068-Decided November 15, 1937-District Court of
Denver-Hon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-On rehearing.
Judgment reversed.
HELD: 1. Where it clearly appears that the summons was unsigned, no summons was served for it had no validity and its service
gave no jurisdiction.
2. Where the objection is jurisdictional, the court may elect to
ignore defective abstract and assignment, if such they be, and look to
the whole record. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke.
PROCESS-APPEAL AND

CORPORATIONS--STOCKHOLDERS-ACCOUNTING-SALARIES

OF OF-

FICERS-Langlois,et al. vs. Merchant Investment Co., et al.-No.
14060-Decided November 15, 1937-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where the minutes of the corporation show that all
directors (who constituted all of the stockholders) were present at a
meeting which elected officers of a corporation and fixed their salaries,
as allowed by the by-laws, and where they show that no officer voted
for the approval of his or her salary, and where it appears that there
were no creditors, and no allegation of fraud or collusion, the action of
the officers in voting salaries to themselves was not illegal.
2. Since those present at the meeting would have been estopped
to deny the illegality of that which they themselves formally adopted,
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their successors in interest, who received stock from such prior officers
are in no better position.
3.
Where it appears that the secretary of a $50,000 corporation,
"practically managed the place ever since it was started," the court will
not say that $1,500 a year salary was unreasonably high. EN BANC.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Holland dissents.

MISSING LAW BOOKS
Judge Johnson reports that Vols. 11, 51 and 53, Colorado Reports, are missing from Division 6, and he asks that all attorneys check
their office and return these volumes when located.

CHANGES IN ADDRESSES
Miss Crosby, secretary to James A. Woods, states that from time
to time an attorney will call her office and complain fretfully that DICTA
is being sent to his former address. This young lady has enough on her
hands, between Jim Woods and keeping DICTA records, without being
required to go into a trance once a month for the purpose of finding out
if an attorney has changed his office. So hereafter send in to the secretary's office a notice of change in your address and it will be recorded
promptly.
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